Interface administrators, Administrators (Semantic MediaWiki), Curators (Semantic MediaWiki), Editors (Semantic MediaWiki), Suppressors, Administrators, trusted
6,956
edits
m
no edit summary
No edit summary |
mNo edit summary |
||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
{{Style P-HPB SB. Title continued |Space and Time|4-179}} | {{Style P-HPB SB. Title continued |Space and Time|4-179}} | ||
... | {{Style P-No indent|will have been evident that many of the foregoing considerations are no less applicable to it than to the form of the external sense or space. But though this is so, even greater difficulty is commonly experienced in grasping the truth that time is not a condition of existence out of consciousness than the same truth about space. For time as the form of the internal sense is the condition of ''all ''our representations, internal as well as external, whereas space applies only to the latter. But when it is attempted to put the difficulty into the form of an objection it will nearly always be found that the objector has not thoroughly mastered the distinction between the real and the empirical. ''For'' ''us'' the empirical is real. Mr. St. George Stock has more than once in the columns of ''The Spiritualist ''newspaper drawn a very acute and fertile comparison between the phenomenal world, as Berkeley represented it, and the so-called illusions to which the senses of a person under mesmeric influence may be made subject. Sensation is sensation, and is equally real whether the occasion be normal or abnormal, His speaking of God as “the Divine Mesmerist” is strictly appropriate to Berkeley’s conception. In like manner with regard to time, the notion of illusion must be altogether dismissed. Time is empirically real, precisely because it is ''our ''condition of experience. “But,” said Kant, “if I could intuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and consequently of change, would not appear.” You see here the same Copernican reversal of the point of view which was noticed in the case of Space. What we have to avoid is the fallacy and the inconsistency of attributing anything to experience apart from the condition of experience that it be experienced, or in other words, of attributing to anything out of consciousness all the incidents of a product of which consciousness is at least one factor. As Kant says elsewhere, “we cannot say ‘all things are in time,’ because in this conception of things in general we abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, ‘all things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time,’ then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality a priori.”}} | ||
I wish I could abstract, within the reasonable limits, already, I fear, transcended, of such a paper as this, the wealth of demonstration with which Kant has illuminated this subject. If any of you wish to pursue it, I cannot help you better than by referring you to the recent masterly work, ''The Philosophy of Kant, ''by which Professor Caird has conferred so signal a service upon metaphysical students in this country. It is not of course to be supposed that Kant or his idealist successors have left unanswered the questions or unsolved the difficulties which at once present themselves when the phenomenal character of the objective world is fairly apprehended. I hoped to have entered upon one of these in some account of the idea or postulate of substance in the present paper. But I have found it impossible to comprise within its limits even the briefest intelligible abstract of the ontology of idealism, Yet does its study well reward the earnest student. But for us, some of whom are almost daily witnessing marvels wholly incredible to the outside world, it is chiefly important that we should be able to conceive the conformity of these facts to truths far otherwise arrived at. It is primarily essential that we should recognise “matter,” the universe of sense, as mere manifestation of powers and agencies that lie behind it, and which, since the order and evolution of phenomena show them to be intelligent, though automatic, may well be called spirit, or the “soul of things.” This enables us to see that the power of spirit over “matter” is simply the power of spirit over itself. Then, by apprehending the formal relativity of Space and Time to the faculties of cognition, we have only to suppose an exaltation of the faculty to account for clairvoyance, for the instantaneous “journeys” of the soul, and for its frequent glimpses into what, to us, and to it, in its lower elevation, is futurity. But it remains for us also to recognise the phenomenal character of the inner consciousness, that which is so confidently called self-consciousness. Herein, it may be, metaphysics will throw some light, direct or indirect, on that question of “the intelligence” which is just now so sorely perplexing us. These are questions for ourselves, and which it much behoves us to work out. For the materialistic world, let it rejoice in its “common sense,” despising metaphysics, as it despises Spiritualism, and go its ways. It has as little of the culture of the higher reason as it has of honest appreciation of evidence. We have facts which not ignorance, however dense, not prejudice, however illiberal, not contempt, however arrogant, can in the least disturb, albeit we ourselves may be harassed, discredited, and injured. But this is not enough. Reason must descend upon those facts, and philosophy must embrace experience. Then shall truth triumph in the world, be whose will the honour, and whose must the shame. | |||