HPB-SB-14-41

H. P. Blavatsky Scrapbooks

from Adyar archives of the International Theosophical Society

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vol. 14, p. 41	volume 14, page 41 vol. title: vol. period: 1882 pages in vol.: 174
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eng • рус

October 28, 1882.]

LIGHT.

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ON SOME THEOSOPHIC DOCTRINES.

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By the Hon. Roden Noel.

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I.

I desire to say a few words on the solution of Spiritist phenomena propounded by the writer of “Fragments of Occult Truth,” in the Theosophist, a solution generally accepted by Eastern, and by some able Western, members of the Theosophical Society.

With the claim of this occultist doctrine to infallible revelation I cannot deal, the claim being made without any proofs offered, for I cannot accept the wonders recorded in Mr. Sinnett’s interesting book as proofs. We know what the Jews said to our Blessed Lord about His miracles; far be it from me to imitate them; still, mere wonders are not enough, especially in these later days. And the editor of the Theosophist assures us that the Brothers are “not subject to the tyranny of social or religious laws: every ordinary or other law loses its rights over them.” Herein they differ from the holiest we know, Jesus Christ. But we of the West have to deal primarily with similar claims put forward by the most ancient branch of our own Christian Church, and when we have dealt with these it will be time to consider others. So that if we are to discuss the questions mooted in occult philosophy at all, it can only be by examining with our own reasoning faculty the statements of its votaries.

And here I shall consider a few of the sentences in these “Fragments,” which do not commend themselves to me as in harmony with the ordinary light of reason vouchsafed to us, though of course one cannot say how they might appear after submission to a long course of initiation among the adepts of the Himalayas. It is to the doctrine of “Shells” that my objection particularly applies. My general objection is that this doctrine appears to make our one personality into a kind of ship with watertight compartments, each of which, at the catastrophe called death, is forthwith capable of setting up for itself, and floating free of the rest, or of being destroyed, leaving the rest of the structure intact. According to this teaching every man would be a colony, temporarily attached indeed to one stem, but really a whole system of independent cells.

Now Authority is by some supposed competent to establish any doctrine of any Church, whether Christian or Hindu, however contrary to reason. But until we are fully satisfied with its credentials, private judgment will have its say. And this view of man certainly seems to contradict reason and consciousness quite as much as any doctrine hard to be believed propounded by inquisitor, or Calvinist. Of the “shells,” which are said to be for the most part the agents that masquerade under the guise of deceased persons in the séance-room, we are told by the writer of “Fragments” (Theosophist for October, 1881) that “in them still survive the major portions of the intelligence, will-power, and knowledge that they possessed when incorporated in the human combination;” that “they are often powerful and highly intelligent and continue to survive for lengthened periods, their intense desire for earthly life enabling them,” &c. But at the same time we are assured that “these shells, these eidolons or elementaries, have lost their immortality”—“from them the divine essence has for ever departed—they are not Spirits at all—they are all that remains of the dead when their Spirits have flown.” Well, it seems that a good deal more of them remains than we had been accustomed to suppose!

Over here we had supposed that what remains of the dead when their spirits have flown is their influence, and their dead bodies; instead of that we learn that their often highly developed intelligence remains behind, and that not in the mere sense of influence over others, but as a separate entity divorced from their Spirits, and therefore from their own true selves, yet capable of pretending to be these true selves! “The spiritual Ego,” we are told again, “is dissipated, and ceases to exist. It is the result of the action of spirit on matter. Withdraw the oxygen and the flame ceases, withdraw the Spirit and the spiritual Ego disappears. The sense of individuality in Spirit cannot exist without combination with matter.” And yet we read again, much to our astonishment after the preceding statements, “It is possible for elementaries to have a perfect intellectual knowledge and appreciation of virtue.” “The disembodied elementary has glimpses of things in the astral light where everything is recorded;” it “easily picks up sufficient facts for its purpose, and by its will materialises itself partly out of,” &c. Now two difficulties occur to the uninitiated. First, how very naked and uncomfortable must the Spirit be, deprived of so large a proportion of its will-power, intelligence, and virtue! And, secondly, how much more naked and uncomfortable must the elementary be deprived of the Spirit, that formerly supported and constituted it! The spiritual Ego has ceased to exist; and yet we have will, appreciation of virtue, and a high degree of intelligence left! Whence, then, were these latter derived? What made them possible, and gave them actual existence? And what makes them possible or existent now? Were they not dependent on the spiritual Ego after all? If not, on what were they dependent? Of what entity or substance were they functions? And what rôle, then, had the spiritual Ego to play in that which the writer characteristically terms “the human combination”? What was the use of it, if you can still have will, virtue, and intelligence without it? What more does a man consist of, if you leave the body out of account? what more does he want? Surely he only wants a little more of this very humanity, which we are accustomed to call will, intelligence, and virtue. But if he can get so much of them as this writer assures us he can, without the Spirit, why not a good deal more? The Spirit seems to be only a superfluity after all.* It might, perhaps, be replied that we got these qualities originally from the Spirit, but in some cases we can retain them without its assistance. How would this be possible? What is denied is the identity of the elementary with the spiritual Ego. Therefore there is no question here at all of our retaining what we originally received. For we are either extinguished, or flown elsewhere. What has got hold of our partial, but still rather highly developed, humanity is another entity altogether, though it was once incorporated “in the human combination.” Part of the will, intelligence, and virtue of a man can, therefore, be drifted off from him, and, like a portion cut off from a hydra, can set up an individuality of its own. Though it was his, it is no longer he; else we should have to ask, which is the right and original man—this old intelligence remaining, or the informing spirit which has left it? But then if the man exists no longer, these conscious functions can no longer be his, though they were so once. Whose are they then now? It is contended that they form an amalgam or combination by themselves, which is soon to die out altogether. Now, how is it possible to conceive functions without an organism, qualities without substance, powers or activities without an agent, will, virtue, and intelligence without a virtuous, intelligent willer, or person willing? To the Western mind it seems impossible. But the Western mind is very shallow. For what we mean by Ego, or person, is just precisely the conscious unity, or identity, underlying and pervading the diversity of experience in the exercise of these very functions of will, intelligence, and conscience. An act of intelligence, will, or virtue that shall not be identified as mine or yours, as belonging, that is, to a continuous identity of experience, identical in its very diversity, we cannot at all imagine. The simplest perception must be a perception of someone. For otherwise it cannot be compared with simultaneous and past perceptions belonging to the same conscious focus or centre of personality, and if not compared it cannot be pronounced different to some and similar to others, and if not so pronounced upon comparison (however swiftly and instinctively) it cannot be classified, characterised, and named; but that which is not characterised more or less distinctly is not understood, does not enter into consciousness at all—is not a perception, an act of will, or judgment, a process of reasoning: far less “a perfect intellectual knowledge and appreciation of virtue.” The Ego, self, or person, being gone, it is absolutely certain that these functions thereof cannot remain for one single minutest fraction of a second; whereas elementaries are declared to remain for years, and only gradually to melt away. The self or person is in and by the exercise of his functions, and the functions are in and by him. The notions are correlative, and mutually implicit one in another. Abstract thought may, for convenience sake, divide them, but, in reality, they cannot be divided.

These manifesting Intelligences assuredly do shew a certain amount of spontaneous individuality—they perceive, remember, understand a question, frame an answer. But you cannot divide an individual intelligence in half, withdrawing the individuality from one half—the half from which it is supposed to be gone still retaining the differential, or special characteristics of it. Can Authority bid us believe that two straight lines may enclose a space? Must we even suspend our judgment on the subject? I trow not. Let us keep our thought free and virile.

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* “Anglo-Indian” (Theosophist, September, 1882) says expressly that some of these agents are souls, persons, plus shells—with the Spirit gone altogether! And in spite of their noumenal unity they are to “disintegrate.”

Editor's notes

Sources

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  Light, v. 2, No. 95, October 28, 1882, pp. 479-480