HPB-SB-10-22: Difference between revisions
mNo edit summary |
mNo edit summary |
||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
{{Style P-HPB SB. Title continued |The British Association|10-21}} | {{Style P-HPB SB. Title continued |The British Association|10-21}} | ||
. | {{Style P-No indent|nomena, which we designate as consciousness or thought, and which, however intimately connected with those of life, are yet essentially distinct from them.}} | ||
{{Style S-HPB SB. Continues on|10-23}} | “When the heart of a recently-killed frog is separated from its body and touched with the point of a needle, it begins to beat under the excitation of the stimulus, and we believe ourselves justified in referring the contraction of the cardiac fibres to the irritability of their protoplasm as its proper cause. We see in it a remarkable phenomenon, but one, nevertheless, in which we can see unmistakable analogies with phenomena purely physical. There is no greater difficulty in conceiving of contractility as a property of protoplasm than there is in conceiving of attraction as a property of the magnet. | ||
“When a thought passes through the mind it is associated, as we have now abundant reason for believing, with some change in the protoplasm of the cerebral cells. Are we, therefore, justified in regarding thought as a property of the protoplasm of these cells, in the sense in which we regard muscular contraction as a property of the protoplasm of muscle? or is it really a property residing in something far different, but which may yet need for its manifestation the activity of cerebral protoplasm? | |||
“If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the admitted phenomena of matter, we should be bound to accept the first of these conclusions as the simplest, and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the physical id phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but there is no conceivable analogy, and the obvious and continuous path which we have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by which as by id abridge we may span it over; for even from irritability, to which, on a superficial view, consciousness if may seem related, it is as absolutely distinct as it is from any of the ordinary phenomena of matter. | |||
“It has been argued that because physiological activity must be a property of every living cell, psychical activity must be equally so, and the language of the metaphysician has been carried into biology, and the ‘cell soul’ spoken of as a conception inseparable from that of life. | |||
“That psychical phenomena however, characterised as they essentially are by consciousness, are not necessarily coextensive with those of life, there cannot be a doubt. How far back in the scale of life consciousness may exist we have as yet no means of determining, nor is it necessary for our argument that we should. Certain it is that many things, to all appearance the result of volition, are capable of being explained as absolutely unconscious acts; and when the swimming swarm-spore of an alga avoids collision, and by a reversal of the stroke of its cilia backs from an obstacle lying in its course, there is almost1 certainly in all this nothing but a purely unconscious act. It is but a case in which we find expressed the great law of the adaptation of living beings to the conditions which surround them. The irritability of the protoplasm of the ciliated spore responding to an external stimulus sets in motion a mechanism derived by inheritance from its ancestors, and whose parts are correlated to a common end— the preservation of the individual. | |||
“But even admitting that every living cell were a conscious and thinking being, are we therefore justified in asserting that its consciousness like its irritability is a property of the matter of which it is composed? The sole argument on which this view is made to rest is that from analogy. It is argued that because the life phenomena, which are invariably found in the cell, must be regarded as a property of the cell, the phenomena of consciousness by which they are accompanied must be also so regarded. The weak point in the argument is the absence of all analogy between the things compared, and as the conclusion rests solely on the argument from analogy, the two must fall to the ground together. | |||
“In a lecture* to which I once had the pleasure of listening—a lecture characterised no less by lucid exposition than by the fascinating form in which its facts were presented to the hearers—Professor Huxley argues that no difference, however great, between the phenomena of living matter and those of the lifeless elements of which this matter is composed should militate against our attributing to protoplasm the phenomena of life as properties essentially inherent in it; since we know that the result of a chemical-combination of physical elements may exhibit physical properties totally different from those of the elements combined; the physical phenomena presented by water, for example, having no resemblance to those of its combining elements, oxygen and hydrogen. | |||
“I believe that Professor Huxley intended to apply this argument only to the phenomena of life in the stricter sense of the word. As such it is conclusive. But if it be pushed further, and extended to the phenomena of consciousness, it loses all its force. The analogy, perfectly valid in the former case, here fails. The properties of the chemical compound are like those of its components, still physical properties. They come within the wide category of the universally accepted properties of matter, while those of consciousness belong to a category absolutely distinct—one which presents not a trace of a connection with any of those which physicists have agreed in assigning to matter as its proper characteristics. The argument thus breaks down, for its force depends on analogy alone, and here all analogy vanishes. | |||
“That consciousness is never manifested except in the presence of cerebral matter or of something like it there cannot be a question; but this is a very different thing from its being a property of such matter in the sense in which polarity is a property of the magnet, or irritability of protoplasm. The generation of the rays which lie invisible beyond the violet in the spectrum of the sun cannot be regarded as a property of the medium which by changing their refrangibility can alone render them apparent. | |||
“I know that there is a special charm in those broad generalisations which would refer many very different phenomena to a common source. But in {{Style S-HPB SB. Continues on|10-23}} | |||
{{Footnotes start}} | |||
<nowiki>*</nowiki> “The Physical Basis of Life.” See ''Essays and Reviews, ''by T. H, Huxley. | |||
{{Footnotes end}} | |||
Latest revision as of 12:24, 14 August 2024
< The British Association (continued from page 10-21) >
nomena, which we designate as consciousness or thought, and which, however intimately connected with those of life, are yet essentially distinct from them.
“When the heart of a recently-killed frog is separated from its body and touched with the point of a needle, it begins to beat under the excitation of the stimulus, and we believe ourselves justified in referring the contraction of the cardiac fibres to the irritability of their protoplasm as its proper cause. We see in it a remarkable phenomenon, but one, nevertheless, in which we can see unmistakable analogies with phenomena purely physical. There is no greater difficulty in conceiving of contractility as a property of protoplasm than there is in conceiving of attraction as a property of the magnet.
“When a thought passes through the mind it is associated, as we have now abundant reason for believing, with some change in the protoplasm of the cerebral cells. Are we, therefore, justified in regarding thought as a property of the protoplasm of these cells, in the sense in which we regard muscular contraction as a property of the protoplasm of muscle? or is it really a property residing in something far different, but which may yet need for its manifestation the activity of cerebral protoplasm?
“If we could see any analogy between thought and any one of the admitted phenomena of matter, we should be bound to accept the first of these conclusions as the simplest, and as affording a hypothesis most in accordance with the comprehensiveness of natural laws; but between thought and the physical id phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy, but there is no conceivable analogy, and the obvious and continuous path which we have hitherto followed up in our reasonings from the phenomena of lifeless matter through those of living matter here comes suddenly to an end. The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional phenomena can be found by which as by id abridge we may span it over; for even from irritability, to which, on a superficial view, consciousness if may seem related, it is as absolutely distinct as it is from any of the ordinary phenomena of matter.
“It has been argued that because physiological activity must be a property of every living cell, psychical activity must be equally so, and the language of the metaphysician has been carried into biology, and the ‘cell soul’ spoken of as a conception inseparable from that of life.
“That psychical phenomena however, characterised as they essentially are by consciousness, are not necessarily coextensive with those of life, there cannot be a doubt. How far back in the scale of life consciousness may exist we have as yet no means of determining, nor is it necessary for our argument that we should. Certain it is that many things, to all appearance the result of volition, are capable of being explained as absolutely unconscious acts; and when the swimming swarm-spore of an alga avoids collision, and by a reversal of the stroke of its cilia backs from an obstacle lying in its course, there is almost1 certainly in all this nothing but a purely unconscious act. It is but a case in which we find expressed the great law of the adaptation of living beings to the conditions which surround them. The irritability of the protoplasm of the ciliated spore responding to an external stimulus sets in motion a mechanism derived by inheritance from its ancestors, and whose parts are correlated to a common end— the preservation of the individual.
“But even admitting that every living cell were a conscious and thinking being, are we therefore justified in asserting that its consciousness like its irritability is a property of the matter of which it is composed? The sole argument on which this view is made to rest is that from analogy. It is argued that because the life phenomena, which are invariably found in the cell, must be regarded as a property of the cell, the phenomena of consciousness by which they are accompanied must be also so regarded. The weak point in the argument is the absence of all analogy between the things compared, and as the conclusion rests solely on the argument from analogy, the two must fall to the ground together.
“In a lecture* to which I once had the pleasure of listening—a lecture characterised no less by lucid exposition than by the fascinating form in which its facts were presented to the hearers—Professor Huxley argues that no difference, however great, between the phenomena of living matter and those of the lifeless elements of which this matter is composed should militate against our attributing to protoplasm the phenomena of life as properties essentially inherent in it; since we know that the result of a chemical-combination of physical elements may exhibit physical properties totally different from those of the elements combined; the physical phenomena presented by water, for example, having no resemblance to those of its combining elements, oxygen and hydrogen.
“I believe that Professor Huxley intended to apply this argument only to the phenomena of life in the stricter sense of the word. As such it is conclusive. But if it be pushed further, and extended to the phenomena of consciousness, it loses all its force. The analogy, perfectly valid in the former case, here fails. The properties of the chemical compound are like those of its components, still physical properties. They come within the wide category of the universally accepted properties of matter, while those of consciousness belong to a category absolutely distinct—one which presents not a trace of a connection with any of those which physicists have agreed in assigning to matter as its proper characteristics. The argument thus breaks down, for its force depends on analogy alone, and here all analogy vanishes.
“That consciousness is never manifested except in the presence of cerebral matter or of something like it there cannot be a question; but this is a very different thing from its being a property of such matter in the sense in which polarity is a property of the magnet, or irritability of protoplasm. The generation of the rays which lie invisible beyond the violet in the spectrum of the sun cannot be regarded as a property of the medium which by changing their refrangibility can alone render them apparent.
“I know that there is a special charm in those broad generalisations which would refer many very different phenomena to a common source. But in <... continues on page 10-23 >
* “The Physical Basis of Life.” See Essays and Reviews, by T. H, Huxley.