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{{Style S-Small capitals|The}} supposition that man is endowed with a spiritual as well as a material body, which serves as a sort of substratum for the soul to exist or reside in, and which was held by some of the old divines and metaphysicians during the early ages, arises from the consciousness of a necessity for some medium of real existence for the soul, and from the conviction that a being wholly immaterial cannot subsist by itself. But surely it is at once more satisfactory and rational to concede to the soul a real existence, than to deny it such an existence, and yet to endeavour to atone for such a deficiency by annexing another being to it. Whether, therefore, we grant to man a spiritual body, denying that the soul itself has any sort of material existence, or whether we conclude that the soul itself consists in a sort of spiritual essence, such as some suppose annexed to the soul as its spiritual body, does not appear to be a matter of very essential importance. On the whole, nevertheless, there seems to me neither warrant nor necessity for supposing the existence of such a spiritual body in our present state; although we may conclude that after the resurrection, as indeed the Scriptures expressly assure us, such frames will be annexed to our souls instead of the gross material frames they now inhabit. But if our material bodies are then to be rendered spiritual, what will become of our already acquired spiritual bodies? We shall then possess two spiritual bodies of the same nature, which seems unreasonable. I conclude, therefore, that what is called the spiritual body, is but in reality the substance of the soul; and that what is by those contending for a spiritual body during our condition in this life, believed to be the soul, consists in reality only, either in certain of the qualities, or in certain operations of this being, which they would thus reduce to a mere abstract nonentity.

{{Style S-Small capitals|The}} supposition that man is endowed with a spiritual as well as a material body, which serves as a sort of substratum for the soul to exist or reside in, and which was held by some of the old divines and metaphysicians during the early ages, arises from the consciousness of a necessity for some medium of real existence for the soul, and from the conviction that a being wholly immaterial cannot subsist by itself. But surely it is at once more satisfactory and rational to concede to the soul a real existence, than to deny it such an existence, and yet to endeavour to atone for such a deficiency by annexing another being to it. Whether, therefore, we grant to man a spiritual body, denying that the soul itself has any sort of material existence, or whether we conclude that the soul itself consists in a sort of spiritual essence, such as some suppose annexed to the soul as its spiritual body, does not appear to be a matter of very essential importance. On the whole, nevertheless, there seems to me neither warrant nor necessity for supposing the existence of such a spiritual body in our present state; although we may conclude that after the resurrection, as indeed the Scriptures expressly assure us, such frames will be annexed to our souls instead of the gross material frames they now inhabit. But if our material bodies are then to be rendered spiritual, what will become of our already acquired spiritual bodies? We shall then possess two spiritual bodies of the same nature, which seems unreasonable. I conclude, therefore, that what is called the spiritual body, is but in reality the substance of the soul; and that what is by those contending for a spiritual body during our condition in this life, believed to be the soul, consists in reality only, either in certain of the qualities, or in certain operations of this being, which they would thus reduce to a mere abstract nonentity.