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{{Style P-Subtitle|{{Style S-Small capitals|“Buddhism.”}}}} | {{Style P-Subtitle|{{Style S-Small capitals|“Buddhism.”}}}} | ||
{{Style P-Align center|1='''By the Hon. Roden Noel.'''}} | |||
{{Style P-Align center|1=''(Continued from page 492.)''}} | |||
{{Style P-Align center|1=III.}} | |||
It should be distinctly understood that Buddhism (and the editors of the ''Theosophist'' are Buddhists) not only refuses to recognise that human individuality, upon which I have insisted as a great central truth, but expressly regards such recognition as a deadly heresy, as the illusion of illusions, one of the four Upadanas, which are the cause of birth, decay, death, sorrow, pain, and despair. Two well-known words, Mr. Rhys-Davids tells us, have been invented to stigmatise it. In the Brahmajala Sutta, Gautama, after shewing how the unfounded belief in the eternal existence of God arose, goes on to refute the heresy of the Brahmans concerning the eternal existence of the soul. He teaches that the soul will have neither a conscious, nor an unconscious existence after death—will have none at all. Man consists, on the contrary, of five ''skandhas'', or aggregates, ''material qualities, sensations, abstract ideas, tendencies of mind'', and ''mental powers.'' Now, here we have again what I may term the sand-grains-in-one-bag, or loose-beads-on-one-string psychology, against which, as I have endeavoured to shew, all introspective consciousness implacably declares itself. If the sense of individuality be an illusion, and a deadly heresy, it is, at all events, a heresy and illusion which stands at the very foundation of all possible self-consistent, and reasonable philosophy—nay, of any thought and experience whatsoever—a postulate pre-supposed even in the very verbal denial of its reality. No doubt we have had the same sort of suicidal pseudo-philosophy in Europe. Hume and the French Materialists are parents of it with us, and following them came Comte, Mill, and the physiological scientists of to-day. But, assimilating the great thinkers of Germany, our best and latest English thinkers have entirely repudiated such doctrine. I need cite only Stirling, Green, Caird, Wallace, and Hinton. | It should be distinctly understood that Buddhism (and the editors of the ''Theosophist'' are Buddhists) not only refuses to recognise that human individuality, upon which I have insisted as a great central truth, but expressly regards such recognition as a deadly heresy, as the illusion of illusions, one of the four Upadanas, which are the cause of birth, decay, death, sorrow, pain, and despair. Two well-known words, Mr. Rhys-Davids tells us, have been invented to stigmatise it. In the Brahmajala Sutta, Gautama, after shewing how the unfounded belief in the eternal existence of God arose, goes on to refute the heresy of the Brahmans concerning the eternal existence of the soul. He teaches that the soul will have neither a conscious, nor an unconscious existence after death—will have none at all. Man consists, on the contrary, of five ''skandhas'', or aggregates, ''material qualities, sensations, abstract ideas, tendencies of mind'', and ''mental powers.'' Now, here we have again what I may term the sand-grains-in-one-bag, or loose-beads-on-one-string psychology, against which, as I have endeavoured to shew, all introspective consciousness implacably declares itself. If the sense of individuality be an illusion, and a deadly heresy, it is, at all events, a heresy and illusion which stands at the very foundation of all possible self-consistent, and reasonable philosophy—nay, of any thought and experience whatsoever—a postulate pre-supposed even in the very verbal denial of its reality. No doubt we have had the same sort of suicidal pseudo-philosophy in Europe. Hume and the French Materialists are parents of it with us, and following them came Comte, Mill, and the physiological scientists of to-day. But, assimilating the great thinkers of Germany, our best and latest English thinkers have entirely repudiated such doctrine. I need cite only Stirling, Green, Caird, Wallace, and Hinton. | ||
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{{Style P-Quote|1=“As the various parts of a chariot form, when united, the chariot, so the five skandhas, when united in one body, form a being, a living existence.”}} | {{Style P-Quote|1=“As the various parts of a chariot form, when united, the chariot, so the five skandhas, when united in one body, form a being, a living existence.”}} | ||
Between the illustrations of a chariot, and a pudding-stone there is not, perhaps, much to choose, except for beauty. In both cases, at least, the parts are mechanically juxtaposed; and of such heterogeneous parts, we are assured, is a man made up! The Western mind dissents. When I perceive I also judge, and remember; when I remember I recall my judgment and perception; when I reason my perception, memory, and judgment are involved; when I love that is also true; when I act from a sense of duty it is equally true; when I imagine, and when I desire or will, my other faculties likewise are in exercise; if I ever attain to insight, to perfect knowledge, it can only be when the very essence and substance of all my faculties shall be perfectly fused, and raised to their own highest power, being now lame and mutilated, and not themselves, just in so far as they are mutually separated in their action | Between the illustrations of a chariot, and a pudding-stone there is not, perhaps, much to choose, except for beauty. In both cases, at least, the parts are mechanically juxtaposed; and of such heterogeneous parts, we are assured, is a man made up! The Western mind dissents. When I perceive I also judge, and remember; when I remember I recall my judgment and perception; when I reason my perception, memory, and judgment are involved; when I love that is also true; when I act from a sense of duty it is equally true; when I imagine, and when I desire or will, my other faculties likewise are in exercise; if I ever attain to insight, to perfect knowledge, it can only be when the very essence and substance of all my faculties shall be perfectly fused, and raised to their own highest power, being now lame and mutilated, and not themselves, just in so far as they are mutually separated in their action*: and then how ''can'' thought, love, will, imagination, be “united in one (physical) body”? Why, they all go roaming over the illimitable universe! They are infinite. As to ''Karma'', I would observe, though I will speak further about it presently, that, while it does not really provide a future life for the individual, it might be popularly supposed to do so, and therefore involves a rather mischievous equivoke, has an ambiguous signification. Hence we find Buddhists speaking and thinking as if ''Karma'' did provide a personal future for each, which certainly it does not.† | ||
But, as I have argued, I fear ''ad nauseam'', individuality is, in fact, ''pre-supposed'' in all these skandhas, and their constituent details, to constitute, and give them reality. And therefore the sense of it cannot be an illusion generated by their aggregation, since without it they would not exist to be aggregated. Without willer, feeler, thinker, there is none of them possible. | But, as I have argued, I fear ''ad nauseam'', individuality is, in fact, ''pre-supposed'' in all these skandhas, and their constituent details, to constitute, and give them reality. And therefore the sense of it cannot be an illusion generated by their aggregation, since without it they would not exist to be aggregated. Without willer, feeler, thinker, there is none of them possible. | ||