Interface administrators, Administrators (Semantic MediaWiki), Curators (Semantic MediaWiki), Editors (Semantic MediaWiki), Suppressors, Administrators, trusted
16,910
edits
HPB-SB-5-98: Difference between revisions
m
no edit summary
mNo edit summary |
mNo edit summary |
||
| Line 20: | Line 20: | ||
| item =1 | | item =1 | ||
| type = article | | type = article | ||
| status = | | status = proofread | ||
| continues = | | continues = | ||
| author = | | author = | ||
| Line 34: | Line 34: | ||
}} | }} | ||
... | It was to be taken for granted that the English would find it convenient to make much just now of the Treaty of Paris—albeit the Marquis of Salisbury a year ago spoke quite lightly of that document. Indeed, the Conservative press of England will hear of nothing else but the Treaty of Paris. The ''Pall Mall Gazette'' even goes so far as to say, with all gravity, that “the facts that Russia and Turkey have been at war, and that Russia has got the better of Turkey, are quite irrelevant to the coming deliberations.” These trivial circumstances, it proceeds to say, “cannot affect the conclusion which, upon a consideration of their own interests and of the general interests of Europe, may be arrived at by Austria, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, when assembled by their representatives to sit in judgment on what in fact will be requests by Russia and Turkey to be relieved from engagements to which they are at present firmly bound by the most solemn obligations which States can incur.” That is to say, the war with its tremendous sacrifices of millions of dollars and thousands of lives is to be regarded as if it had not been, and Russia is to gain nothing as the outcome of all her achievements and successes. She is to enter the Conference on precisely the same terms as if she had fought no battles and won no victories—these facts are “quite irrelevant.” The other powers, who yielded, point by point, to Turkey in the preliminary conference of a year ago, and who retired from the work of enforcing their demands, after a weak exchange of idle threats, are to sit as judges upon Russia’s claims, and to be blindly oblivious to the events of the past year. | ||
The absurdity of the expectation that the Treaty of Paris will be taken as the test by which to accept or reject the Russian propositions is apparent when we consider that nearly all the terms of peace would be immediately negatived by the terms of the treaty. Thus the first of the Russian conditions is that Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, shall be an autonomous tributary principality; and subsequent conditions require practically the same for Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the Treaty of Paris guarantees both the “territorial integrity” and the “independence” of the Ottoman Empire. Russia requires the independence of Roumania and Servia. But the Treaty of Paris declares that “the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia” (i. e. the present Roumania) “shall continue to enjoy, under the suzerainty of the Porte and under the guarantee of the contracting Powers, the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession.” Russia seeks the retrocession of Bessarabia; but the treaty stipulates that Bessarabia “shall be annexed to the Principality of Moldavia, under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte.” As to Servia, it is provided that “the Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime Porte.” As to the passage of the Dardanelles, a Convention signed by the Sultan, and made an integral part of the Treaty, declares that “he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established ''as the ancient rule of his Empire'', in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace his Majesty will admit no foreign ship of war into the said Straits.” The Treaty of 1871, in which Russia secured the concession of the provisions for the “neutralization” of the Black Sea, reaffirmed the provision relating to the Dardanelles, and declared that “the principle of the closing of the Straits—such as it has been established by the separate Convention of March 30, 1856, is maintained.” Tested by the Treaty of Paris, therefore, all that is left of the Russian terms of peace is the independence of Montenegro, the Treaty being silent with regard to Montenegro; and the claim for a money indemnity, which, in Turkey’s impoverished condition, would not be worth a great deal. | |||
Unless the English Conservatives crave the reputation of Bourbons, capable neither of learning nor forgetting, they will scarcely attempt to compel Russia, in the hour of her victory, to accept the same conditions which were granted her in her time of adversity, twenty-two years ago. The position of all the Powers has changed since then. Germany has become the dominant force in European politics; France has been enfeebled by heavy losses; the military prestige of Great Britain is not what it was; and Russia has developed immensely in material and military resources. The Treaty of Paris can have no more power than a blank piece of parchment to stay the progress of events. England herself has not been so scrupulous in regard to treaty observances that she can afford to stand as the champion of strict interpretation. Doubtless, some of the demands of Russia may be modified—and the vagueness of their phraseology leaves ample room for change. But to suppose that she is to yield everything, and to accept the position in which she was left in 1856 is going quite too far; and whatever else happens it may be regarded as certain that the Treaty of Paris will be swept away, and that Russia will be accorded the position which her prowess has won. | |||
{{HPB-SB-item | {{HPB-SB-item | ||