(September, October 1897)
Publications:
- Theosophy, vol. XII, no. 6, September 1897, pp. 287-292
- no. 7, October 1897, pp. 342-348
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Title for references: Keightley A - The Power of the Imagination
Short description: Surveys the physiological-psychology account of the imagination — which treats it as strictly re-pro...
Part I signed in the byline "By Archibald Keightley, M. D. {Cantab.}" and closing "Archibald Kkightlf.y." in the scan — a routine OCR misreading of "Archibald Keightley." corrected here. Several recurring OCR letter-level errors in Part I's technical vocabulary have been corrected as routine scanno fixes rather than left standing or flagged: "rr-presentation," "rr-productive," and "rr-combinations" for "re-presentation," "re-productive," and "re-combinations"; "^-presentation" for "re-presentation"; "AYcognition" for "Recognition"; "/»recondition" for "precondition"; "consciousnei»" for "consciousness"; "mattter" for "matter"; "wúth" for "with"; and "anend" for "an end." A stray exclamation point after a quotation from Professor Ladd ("Professor Ladd says 'no,'!") appears to be scanning noise rather than a footnote marker (no corresponding footnote text survives on that page) and has been dropped. Immediately followed, without a title of its own, by a short unsigned filler poem beginning "Some little blades of grass" and closing "—Stephen Crane in The Black Riders," kept separately for the future Text page rather than as part of this article. Part II, "{Concluded}" (no. 7, October 1897), byline not repeated, closing "Archibald Keightley." (correctly spelled this time). Continues directly from Part I with a fresh discussion of Creative imagination from the standpoint of psychology proper (again largely an exposition of Professor G. T. Ladd), then turns to instances offered as evidence of a genuinely creative, non-reproductive imagination (Mozart, Kepler, child prodigies), to the effect of imagination on the body (hypnotic suggestion, blisters, stigmata, "maternal impressions"), and to telepathy and suggestion, before closing with a synthesis distinguishing the "psychic" mind (acting by natural correlation, astral/plastic in nature) from the "noetic" mind or true Self which drives it, and stating that the imagination, as the instrument of the noetic mind, can in principle bring "the whole world... into unison with the ideal, divine Harmony." A handful of further OCR letter-level scannos in Part II have been corrected as routine fixes: "rr-presentation" and "rr-productive" again; "mattter"; "Digiti zed", "Digitize" and similar split-caption OCR noise around the page scans (not part of the article text) silently omitted, as throughout this project.
287
The Power of the Imagination.
In the study of psychology the function and power of the "imagination" at once form an important and fascinating study. But when the power and function are examined in the cold light of "physiological psychology" and a critical analysis is made of the facts which bear on these powers and functions, the mind is apt to become dismayed. Furthermore, one emerges from such studies with a strong impression that any credence in the said powers and functions would constitute an "illusion," if not a "hallucination"; and further it would be inferred that the study would lead to a "delusion" and that the unpsychological and unscientific exercise of the imagination would render a man so "discordant with his environment," whether he be regarded as "external" or "internal actor," that a residence in an insane asylum would become the best means of protection to himself—and his next heirs.
Briefly, for the time, let us ask ourselves whether the common ideas concerning the imagination have any foundation in fact. Imagination here would mean not merely a picturing to the mind of unreal things, but the actual creation by the formative power of the mind of a form in the world of ideas. It matters not whether the form be a subtle resemblance of a "concrete" existence in the world of forms or whether it be a "form of thought," what may be called a "counter" in the world of ideas.
On the other hand, we are confronted with the presentation of physiological psychology. The subject of the "imagination" is approached entirely from the side of sensation—and naturally so. Professor Ladd has, however, gone so far as to draw the induction that the mind is an entity which is obedient to laws of its own, the said laws being akin but superior to the laws of the physiological world.
It would seem natural, then, with this presentment of the subject, to inquire whether, in accord with the older philosophies of the world, there is not a dual aspect of this mind entity as regards imagination. Whether beyond what physiological psychology shows from the point of view of sensation there is an actual formative element in the imagination which operates as one of the less understood laws of this "mind entity." To do this it will be necessary to as briefly as possible state the point of view of sensation.
Taking the physiological evidence we are shown the action of
288 the senses and the function of nervous structures as a whole. The senses and nervous organs present to consciousness the various objects which make an impression upon them. By what process they are so presented is not clearly stated. Save by some few it is not seriously argued that the consciousness is identical with the organic nervous structures. Roughly it is acknowledged that brain is the organ of mind; and the study of automatic as well as reflex actions leads to the conclusion that consciousness must not be confined to the brain alone, but must be extended to the minor nervous ganglia as well.
By the various senses and nerve organs the external world of objects is presented to consciousness. Such a presentation properly effected will constitute a percept. Therefore it becomes easy to see that it will depend on the intensity of sensation, on the repetition of the said sensation and on the attention paid to such sensations, whether the consciousness is clear. On this clearness depends the power of re-presentation or of reproducing to consciousness the sense-effects of the past. These sense-effects of the past, when represented, are the images which the function of the nerve organs called memory places before consciousness. On this view it would appear that imagination (or at least one phase of it) and memory are identical. Memory would then be equivalent to a faculty of storing up images. The senses present to consciousness certain effects; these effects produce to the mind an image. Such images can be recalled and reproduced with more or less distinctness, consciously and subconsciously, and this process is, to physiological psychology, the function and power of imagination.
The phase of imagination which has hitherto been considered is that of re-productive imagination. This phase naturally raises the question as to whether there is productive imagination. This question is answered in the negative. It is asserted that all cases in which this appears to be the case come under the head of subconscious reproduction and that such apparent production is but the modification, transformation and combination of previously existing memory-images derived from conscious and subconscious sense presentations. Imagination is thus strictly limited to sense-experience. It produces new combinations but no new elements, and so-called "creative imagination" is but the production of exceptionally new and original re-combinations of existing material." Unconscious and conscious inspiration are replaced by "passive automatic reproduction" and the scientific genius appears but as "an exceptional power of recombining facts so as to get new ideas."
Normal mental activity must then start only from sense-present-
289 ations and it follows that even this limited power of the imagination can be beneficial only when a balance between it and sense or "real" experience is maintained. Even a perfectly accurate coalescence of image and percept would, if the tendency to reproduce images were in excess, argue a tendency to illusion; for the images would not be "real." Even the mind with its stored up images is not real in comparison with the senses and their activity, for mind on this argument is the product of sense-experience. Is this so? As said before, Professor Ladd says "no," and gives to mind a life and laws of its own, arguing from the law of the conservation of energy.
Let us turn to Professor Ladd and the thought presented to us in his Psychology. For the purpose of the subject in hand it is necessary to quote his thought very largely and further to consider the subject of imagination not merely in an isolated position but in relation to cognate mental or psychic processes such as memory and thought in relation to primary intellection. Now in all these processes one factor is requisite—attention. It stands to reason that without attention there can be no intellection at all. This understood, the first and most constant form of intellection is the instantaneous awareness of resemblance. Such a process is necessary for all elaboration of experience and the most primary organization of mental life. This consciousness of resemblance necessitates the consciousness of difference and these two are primary component factors of mental life. Upon them depends the entire series of mental complexes which constitute the development of perception. With this development "the relative amount of sensation complexes that have a peripheral origin, becomes smaller: that due to manifold revived ideas and to subtle and rapid judgments habitually performed, becomes greater." Thus we see that perception becomes more and more a matter of ideation with the development of the mental life. And the converse is also true—viz.: that such ideation adds to the value of sense-perception and the possibilities of development of sense-perception involve an increase in the wealth of sensuous details and of the higher ideal and intellectual qualities. It becomes plain that from the side of Physiological Psychology "our power to constitute the different mental factors into the unity of one state (the 'Mind' or 'Soul') is dependent upon the influence of ideas."
Now both sense-perception and self-consciousness (from this point of view) are "presentation psychoses." Memory, imagination and thought are, on the other hand, representative. Plainly all these three alike depend on the fundamental faculty of ideation and "in this sense are developments of one and the same form of mental life." To briefly distinguish them:
290
Memory differs in the characteristic of recognition. It develops pari passu with the consciousness of time and self.
Imagination differs in that recognition is suppressed and the process is freed from the past.
Thought differs in this that when we are distinctly thinking and not merely imagining, the ideas which succeed each other are more abstract, less linked to their concrete complexity, and possess more of a scheme. Furthermore in trains of thought the contiguous factors are seen to have a different origin. In other words thinking is a development of the relating consciousness of primary intellection and is a process of relating together with an immediate awareness of the relation.
As Professor Ladd says, "Recognition is the essential psychological peculiarity of memory as a developed and conscious mental activity. We do not have memory till the reproduced image is recognized."
For the purposes of recollection, voluntary attention is necessary. This attention is "a selective and distributive energy working toward an end consciously conceived of," and controls all the "completeness of the reproductive processes in the interest of that end."
The present psychosis in a complete act of developed memory, including both recollection and reproduction, is consciously related to the past of my experience as a representative of that past. The reproductive image is not merely of the past but it is of and in my past. Memory as distinct from the laws of reproduction, becomes clear. Reproduction is, then, a precondition of recognitive memory. This is a step beyond the physiological theory of "the recurrence of similar forms of associated cerebration" or habits of cerebral reaction. For although what is called "retentive memory" implies the hygiene of brain, nerve and bodily tissues with the complete circulation of the blood, there have yet to be included the psychical conditions of retentive memory. These are mainly covered by the relation which attention bears in the production of percepts. In this connection the observation of Kursmaul is worth recording: viz.; "The more concrete the idea the more readily the word to designate it is forgotten when the memory fails."
On analysis it will be found that the attempts to explain recognitive activity by physiological activity are vain. It is not to be explained "as though it were a mere succession of consciousnesses of any kind" or of impressions familiar and resembling previously existing impressions plus a general consciousness. Recognitive activity is sui generis and as a development of memory belongs to the mind
291 as an integral self and is one of the functions governed by the laws of that self which are akin to, somewhat dependent on but superior to the laws of the physiological organism. For although in many cases memory seems to be a sort of special and isolated piece of psycho-physical mechanism, that essence of it by which we transcend the past and connect by a true spiritual synthesis into a known reality with the past, has to be related with the whole man, body and mind—as the subject who remembers.
The almost inextricable interlinking of thought, memory and imagination has rendered necessary the extensive dealing with memory at this length in order to clear the ground for the expansion of the view of the power and function of the imagination. The physiological view is too small to account for the facts and dwarfs the scope of the subject-mind or soul, of which it will be seen that memory and imagination are, when guided by will, correlated forces.
Let us turn then to the imagination. We find that it is partly lower and partly higher than memory. In the first place the psycho-physical mechanism tends to produce pictures, but, unless there is recognition such process must be classed below memory. In contrast to this we see that by virtue of imagination the inventor, the artist, the poet, the philosopher and the man of pure science are able to transcend all the memories of their own past and even of their race.
Again if imagination be merely image-reproducing it is as a faculty distinctly below that of "thinking." It is clear, however, that "thinking" in all its higher functions depends on the developed and trained power of the imagination. Imagination and intellect cooperate and interpenetrate; but analysis shows that while the merely reproductive form of imagination closely resembles the lower memory so long as there is a low degree or no recognitive energy, the apparently creative forms rather resemble that lofty and almost abstract thinking which leaps to conclusions with an immediacy and a certainty comparable in its own sphere of action only to the intuitive processes of perception.
Physiological psychology proceeds to argue that, since no object can be constituted by activity of re-presentation which may not be analyzed into factors of presentation experience, "in so-called creative imagination the factors themselves are voluntary recombinations existing only while the mind creates them"; and that it is in connection with the correlated development of intellect and will that the faculty of imagination develops: or, in other words, that the primary processes of ideation develop into the faculty of imag-
292 ination. This, of course, is the more modern rendering of Locke's famous dictum "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu," and, so far as creative imagination is concerned, that "there is nothing new under the sun."
Before going further it would be well to make clear the distinctions between "Fancy" and "Imagination." Professor Ladd says that Fancy is so distinguished:
(1) By having less regard for the probable as determined by known facts and laws; (2) by being less likely to be connected with practical interests other than mere amusement; (3) by being less bound by considerations of method in the attainment of its lower and more immediate end; (4) by consequently being narrower in the range of subjects to which it can be applied; (5) by serving more temporary uses; (6) by ministering to a lower form of aesthetical feeling.
The way is thus cleared for the classification of imagination. First there is "Reproductive" which is closely allied to memory; then there is the "Creative" concerning which, as we have seen, it is asserted that it is only re-creative or at most that it only combines anew previously existing memories and images. These two divisions cover the various kinds of imagination which may briefly be divided into (1) Practical, (2) Scientific, (3) Artistic and aesthetical, (4) Ethical and religious.
Archibald Keightley.
342
The Power of the Imagination.
At this point of our study we may fairly devote further consideration to "Creative" imagination from the point of view of Psychology proper.
Genuine Productive or Creative Imagination, in the higher meaning of the words, involves much more than mere combinations into new forms of the factors and objects of past experiences. Conscious selective activity must be directed upon these factors and objects with a view to the realization of an ideal; but in saying this, it is implied again that the highest exercises of so-called imagination require a corresponding development of the allied faculties of perception, memory, thought and choice. Every ideal is itself a creation of the imagination (and herein the "newness" of the object is found); it may seem to spring from the first almost complete as it were, into the consciousness; but it is more likely to be the result of a growth and its very complexity in unity is significant of an intelligent recognition given to the necessity of choice among many factors and many objects of past experience. Creative imagination is, then, always teleological; it is constructive according to a plan.
Such a complex performance involves (1) remembered experience in the form of past presentations of sense and of self-consciousness; (2) analysis, by discriminating consciousness, of these presentation experiences; (3) desire to combine the factors, discovered by analysis, into new products—and this often accompanied by dissatisfaction with the imperfections of past presentations; (4) some, at least dim, mental picture of a new unity to be effected by the combination, as its end (some semblance of an "ideal"—that is to say—held before the mind).
It is thus declared that in all imagination of wholly new creations, the mind takes its point of starting from one or more memory images and then by a process of combination and differentiation it pictures the newly created object. This, too, according to an "ideal." But whence comes this ideal?
Psychology admittedly allows that "psychological science cannot wholly explain the origin of certain products of creative imagination," and that "certainly they not infrequently arise in such a way as to give countenance to the word 'divine.'"
For example, when Mozart at first sight played the grand organ, treading its pedals aright, and in other similar instances, in the cases of extraordinary mathematical faculty instanced by very young children, what are we to say? Shall we not rather tend to follow Kepler who declared that in imagining the laws of motion he "read the thoughts of God," and declare with Ladd that the imagination in its highest creative form is a function of that unit being—the mind 343or Soul—which has a nature and laws of its own? That the imagination is that link which connects the visible to the superior world? That a man by virtue of the imagination acts, sees, and feels through his "Inner Being"?
Let us briefly recapitulate. Perception, even, is largely the result of the image-making activity of the mind and even here perception involves idealization. For even in the case of the child, the savage, the half-tutored man, the total world in which he lives is very mixed, created partly by fancy, partly by lower imagination, partly by perceptive and inferential knowledge. If with Goethe we say that "imagination is the preparatory school of thought," and look on imagination as derived from sense-perception rather than as a function of the "inner being," we are presented with the view of Ladd that:—
Everyone's primary bodily self becomes self-known as a "thing-Being," the subject of passive and actual experiences of a peculiar kind. But consciously discriminated processes of ideation, thought and non-sensuous feelings, can no more float in midair as mere objective pictures than can the coarser and more sensuous bodily self-feelings. It is inevitable that intellect should form the conception of a Self which is a real being, the subject of all such non-bodily states. Such consciousness in the form of being a mind or soul—a real subject for psychical processes—is at first vague and fitful.
Ladd proceeds by saying that it is,
By the resultant of many acts of memory, imagination, reasoning and naming that the Knowledge of the Self as a Unitary Being is attained. The Self I thus come to know is regarded as the one subject of all the states of consciousness. In one and the same act the mind makes itself the object of its self-knowledge and believes in the real being of that which it creates as its own object. Then it passes into other states of knowledge that dissolve this unique creation by turning the attention to external things.
It would certainly seem to follow from this that the Yogi or mystic absorbed in contemplation of interior things is less wasteful of his creative force than the man who deliberately chooses to dwell in the external world.
It is also clear that the entire world of experience is liable to be lived over in three different ways.
Once, in imagination that projects, as here and now present, what is wholly yonder and in the future.
Once, in what we call actual and living experience, the immediate awareness of perception and self-consciousness.
Once, in memory.
Thus at least one of the functions of the imagination is that present, past and future are united in an eternal now.
Another is seen in the profound effect of the imagination upon the body, upon the entire secretory and vaso-motor system. This is 344emphasized by the modern experiments in hypnotism. By suggestion swellings can be produced and made to disappear, secretions excited or repressed, and even in relatively rare cases, burns and stigmata can be produced. All physicians of any intelligent observation know the close relation between imagination and the sanitary condition of peripheral organs. Instances one might multiply to any extent but these will be given later on.
We may now approach the domain of advancing a theory of the functions and power of the imagination in action. A Theory is a synthesis explanatory of facts by reference to an ideal principle.
When we look on the theories which are the results of the "scientific imagination" we are less afraid of being accused of "fancy" and "hallucination." Let us only refer to the "luminiferous ether"; to "electricity" regarded as a physical entity; to the view of "atoms too large to be regarded as mere points (Euclid's definitions) and yet not large enough to be imagined in terms of sensuous imagination"; to "missing links"; to "infinitesimally small variations" as put forward to prove the doctrine of evolution;—and we shall find ourselves in good company in advancing a theory which shall account for that bugbear of psychology, "the retentive memory," for the very action of mind on body apart from purely physiological processes and for the permanent creations of the imaginative faculty under the law of the conservation of energy.
Take the facts presented to us by hypnotism. Mantegazza says that at one time he was able to induce local reddening of the skin by simply thinking intently of the spot; he asserts that on occasion even wheals appeared. Delboeuf says that he can influence the secretion of saliva by his will or ideas. This last is a common experience. Many pharmacists can in themselves produce the effects of drugs by thinking intently on what they know of their action, especially if this action has to do with the vascular system. Tocachon is recorded to have hypnotized a subject, and after placing postage stamps on the shoulder and covering with a bandage, suggested that this was a blister. The subject was watched carefully and after twenty hours the skin was found thickened and dead, of a yellowish-white color, the region puffy and surrounded by an intensely red zone. The blister was photographed. Charcot and his pupils at the Salpetrière not infrequently produced burns by suggestion, but only after the lapse of some hours. Bourru and Burot of Rochefort record a case where epistaxis was produced, and another in which after writing letters on the skin with a blunt probe these letters at a given hour were reproduced during a second hypnotic state in scarlet lines on the skin.
345 The records of hypnotic telepathy only go to extend such results by giving an effect at a distance. Telepathy is defined as the transference of thoughts, feelings and sensations from A to B by some means other than the recognized sense-perceptions of B. This transference is supposed to be caused by a strong concentration of thought on the part of A. It is said that A can make B act by merely concentrating on what A is to do. Others say that it is the concentration of A's will on B which causes B's action. Liébault by his experience and experiments supports this by the assertion that it is the power of attention which sums up the action of the mind on the physical, and that it is this concentration of the attention which isolates the senses and causes a so-to-say deeper layer of their action to become manifest. All observers of hypnotism agree in the power of "Suggestion," whether derived from within or from without the subject.
Suggestion is defined as an operation which produces a given effect on a subject by acting on his intelligence. Every suggestion essentially consists in acting on a person by means of an idea: every effect suggested is the result of a phenomenon of ideation. The operator must have in mind a clear image of the effect he intends to produce. As a rule, however, he cannot produce it unless he is setting in activity a mental association previously existing in the subject's mind. Braid declared that successful hypnotism involved both the imagination of the operator and of the subject.
Now when an image is aroused in the mind it tends to cause the reproduction of all the images which resemble it, or which were formed with it in an anterior act of consciousness. The hypnotized subject when awake does not remember the hypnotized states, but when hypnotized again has the memory of those states, and not infrequently has the memory of the ordinary waking and sleeping states as well. There is, so to say, a hyper-æsthesia of memory, and there is hardly a single fact of our mental life which cannot be artificially reproduced and heightened by such means.
As a rule, then, it is the association of ideas, of the image with the act, which produces the act in the subject; the only necessary condition being that a clear image of the act in question shall be distinctly formed in the operator's mind. The ideas, or images, so formed, may therefore be according to circumstances, either pathogenic or therapeutic agents. Diseases caused by imagination or diseases caused by a fixed idea are real diseases and are not "imaginary" or "hallucinations." In many cases they display undisputed objective symptoms. Auto-suggestion shows that once subjects have accepted the idea that they are affected by some
346 functional disturbance, such disturbance is developed in some more or less objective degree.
Such effects, then, are those of the association of ideas. Bain, who may be termed the champion of "association," says that everything of the nature of acquisition supposes a plastic property in the human system giving permanent coherence to acts that have been performed together. The physical body in its growth shows the effect of associated acts. These acts must have been united in a plastic substance. Consequently every cell in every organ of the body is a representative in some degree of such associated acts, and every cell therefore has its own memory. This plastic property of the cell, consisting of acts previously associated together, involves an "inner person" consisting of something which retains the impressions received from action, sensation, emotion, and thought. The correlation among the vital forces, as Carpenter has shown, involves some definite relation which explains the dynamic unity. Such forces, in giving origin to each other, cease to exist as such. This dynamic unity in part is found in this plastic property which is found in the older philosophies in the astral or etheric body which forms the link between mind and matter. This astral body is the basis of the cell memory, of the "retentive" memory alluded to above. Even in view of the scorn of anatomists who dissect the cell and find no evidence of its memory, this astral "theory" may be put forward, for they are forced to allow that the germ-cell does not supply the force, but that it does supply the directive agency. The imagination is thus one of the plastic powers of the "inner being" operating through the astral and constituting the memory of previous existences.
But all imagination as acting on the physical body cannot be attributed to "association of ideas." Take the instance of what are called "maternal impressions." The impression on the mother is intense and profound. Records are shown that such impressions produce on the unborn child the imprint of cats' paws, of mice, of fruits of various kind, various deformities of limbs and their total absence, resemblances to various animals. The Greeks used this property by surrounding the future mother with perfect physical models, and an instance with animals is recorded in the Bible, attributed to the patriarch Jacob. We may say with Van Helmont that:
The imaginative power of a woman, vividly excited, produces an idea, which is the connecting medium between body and soul. This transfers itself to the being with whom the woman stands in the most immediate relation, and impresses upon it that image which the most agitated herself.
347 In such effects of imagination and in the effects of hypnotism one thing now becomes plain. Equally is this the case with the cognate faculties of memory, imagination and thought. A clear image is necessary to all. That clearness depends upon attention or concentration. By such attention or concentration the vital forces playing in their correlations throughout the entire organisms of subject and operator are brought into unison, or, in other words, into an equality of their respective oscillations. Images so produced in unison are intercommunicable and are then rendered into terms of act or thought by the converting organs, which stand as a link between mind and body or the various minds and bodies so acting in unison. The character of the effect is to a very large extent determined by the various spheres in which such unison of vibration is brought into play. The "plastic property" of which Bain speaks, the astral, will have its effect in the spheres of action, sensation, emotion and thought, or in what we may strictly call the psychic sphere of action. But when we regard what we may call the higher sphere of thought—that upon which the higher and true creative imagination depends—that sphere whence come the teleological ideas, the plans, the ideals, we are dealing with a sphere with which physiological psychology and most Western psychologies fail to deal. True it is that Kant and Schopenhauer have felt its force and touched upon it, and that Ladd has foreshadowed it, as shown in H. P. Blavatsky's article on "Psychic and Noetic Action" (see Studies in Occultism, No. III).
Let us admit that the psychic consciousness is a vibration in terms of more or less material (physical and astral) motion, and in this we may—if we also admit the correlation of such motions or forces—thoroughly agree with psychological science. We may thus account for all the arguments contained in the earlier portions of this essay on the basis of memory, imagination and thought. But the phenomena of consciousness, the consciousness which is not merely physiological, must be regarded as the activities of some Real Being, the "inner being" of Ladd. This Real Being is thus manifested to itself in the phenomena of consciousness and indirectly to others in the bodily changes. It is the Mind. The mental "faculties," e.g., memory, imagination and thought, are only the modes of behavior in consciousness of this real being. But the integral being, the Self-consciousness, the free will, is of a different and higher order. This it is, the real mind, which acts and develops according to laws of its own, the true noetic psychology, and is correlated with certain molecules and organs. While the psychic mind creates nothing and only acts by a natural correlation in accordance with both the
348 physical laws and its own laws, it is yet used by a Force and guides its direction according to its own development, being stimulated to action by that Force. The senses and muscles are the organs of action; the psychic mind is the guiding reins, while the noetic mind is the driver.
To sum up. Imagination is, as said before, of two kinds, Productive and Reproductive. The reproductive is concerned with the affairs of the psychic consciousness. As seen in the case of hypnotism, the pictures so produced can be communicated to and rendered objective in others. When the instinctive, sensuous cell-memory is stilled by concentration and attention this process is rendered more easy. In such cases deeper spheres of consciousness are opened up and we are then presented with evidence of productive imagination, which may be operated both consciously and subconsciously. By the correlation of force or motion, through the links called astral, plastic or what-not, such motion is given more or less objective effect. The physical is acted upon by the psychic mind, while the psychic mind is set in motion by the noetic mind.
Thus the function of the imagination is enormous and, acting under the driving energy of the noetic mind, impresses itself in the external world. Will so exerted by means of the imagination is practically limitless, both in space and time, for it acts regardless of distance and unites present, past and future (the three categories of time), into an eternal now. By the imagination acting according to the ideal plan and producing and acting on the unison of vibration, the whole world can be brought into unison with the ideal, divine Harmony.
Archibald Keightley.
Footnotes